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The Sea Clammers Doctrine: Reeling in Private Employment
Tax Claims in Worker Misclassification Cases
J. Aaron Ball'
I. INTRODUCTION
When an employer misclassifies an employee as an independent
contractor, should that employee have the right to sue his employer
for failing to withhold and remit payroll taxes to the federal govern-
ment or should the employee be limited to administrative remedies?
Should the courts imply such a right of action in favor of employees or
exercise restraint where Congress failed to explicitly provide for such
a right? Finally, does providing employees the right to sue their em-
ployers in such cases make sense, taking into account various policy
considerations such as fairness, efficiency and enforceability in the ad-
ministration of tax law? This article reviews the law surrounding
these questions and argues that both a correct application of existing
law and policy considerations should preclude employees from suing
their employers and require them to seek administrative remedies.
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA")2 establishes a
federal tax based on wages paid to employees. FICA tax is remitted
to the federal government, then deposited into the Social Security
Trust Fund.3 In a traditional employer-employee relationship, the em-
ployer withholds a percentage of the employee's wages from the em-
ployee's paycheck and the employer remits the money withheld to the
federal government.4 At the same time, the employer also remits a
FICA tax (subject to certain credits) in an amount equal to the per-
centage of wages withheld from the employee. 5 In the employer-em-
1. Associate, Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, Chicago, Illinois; DePaul University Col-
lege of Law, L.L.M., Taxation, 2002; American University, Washington College of Law, J.D.,
1997; Butler University, B.A., 1993. Admitted to practice in Illinois, Wisconsin and the District
of Columbia. The author would like to thank Daniel F. Cullen, Esq. for his insightful comments
on various drafts of this article as well as Brian L. Browdy, Esq., Eric Fader, Esq., Lauren J.
Wolven, Esq. and Kenneth Goldstein, Esq.
2. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, I.R.C. § § 3101-3128 (1986) (amended 2000) (§ 3113
repealed 1976). Unless otherwise indicated herein, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. See McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 721 (11th Cir. 2002).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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ployee relationship, therefore, the employee and the employer each
share approximately one-half of the FICA tax liability. 6 By contrast,
if a worker is classified as an independent contractor, rather than an
employee, the worker bears all the tax burden on his wages under the
Self-Employment Contributions Act ("SECA").7
Workers and employers are subject to varying tax consequences
under the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") depending on
whether the worker is classified as an employee or an independent
contractor. For example, whereas payments to independent con-
tactors may be fully deductible by the employer, payments to employ-
ees may be only partly deductible due to limitations on excessive
compensation. 8
Most workers categorized as "employees" are common law employ-
ees. "Common law employees" are typically individuals who perform
services for an "employer" under certain common law rules.9 The
term "employee" is not defined for income tax withholding pur-
poses.' 0 However, as used in the income tax withholding statutes,
"employee" means a "common law employee."'1 Treasury regula-
tions identify several common law factors that can be used to deter-
mine whether a worker is a "common law employee.
12
6. Id.
7. See McDonald, 291 F.3d at 721.
8. I.R.C. § 162 (1986) (amended 1998); Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-1
(2001).
9. I.R.C. § §3121(d)(2)-(3), 3306(i) (1986) (amended 2000).
10. I.R.C. § 3401(c) (1986) (amended 2001).
11. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(1) (2000).
12. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) provides:
Generally such relationship exists when the person for whom services are performed
has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as
to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by
which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and con-
trol of the employer not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done. In this
connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner
in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so. The right
to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right
is an employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present
in every case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the
individual who performs the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the con-
trol or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and
not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent
contractor. An individual performing services as an independent contractor is not as to
such services an employee under the usual common law rules. Individuals such as phy-
sicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, construction contractors, public stenographers,
and auctioneers, engaged in the pursuit of an independent trade, business, or profes-
sion, in which they offer their services to the public, are independent contractors and
not employees.
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The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") long took the posi-
tion that there were twenty factors for worker classification, 13 but
later acknowledged that other factors may be important to the analy-
SiS. 1 4 The Service considers "control" the primary factor in determin-
ing whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.
In general, when the person for whom services are performed has the
right to control a worker and direct that worker's activities, this de-
gree of control usually indicates that the worker is an employee rather
than an independent contractor. 15 However, notwithstanding the pri-
macy of the "control test," worker classification remains a case-by-
case analysis of individual facts and circumstances. 16
Unlike employees, self-employed persons or independent contrac-
tors have no separate employer to pay the "employer portion" of the
FICA tax. 17 The result is that self-employed persons pay the entire
amount of tax due (paying both the "employee" and "employer" por-
tions of the tax). Accordingly, an employer who properly classifies its
workers as independent contractors, rather than employees, avoids
payment of the "employer" portion of the FICA tax.
Due to the fact-and-circumstances approach to classification and
the significant tax ramifications involved, worker classification is a
hotbed of litigation.18 In particular, workers who claim that their em-
ployers improperly classified them as independent contractors have
sued those employers directly, seeking relief under FICA remunera-
tion for their improper payment of the "employer portion" of FICA,
or an order forcing those employers to correct the workers' Social Se-
curity accounts. 19 The problem for many would-be plaintiffs is that
13. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
14. See supra note 12 (regarding various factors considered in the regulations); Employment
Tax Handbook 104.6, §5.8.1 (Apr. 21, 1999) ("IRS Handbook"); Independent Contractor or Em-
ployee? Training Materials, IRS Training Course 3320-102, TPDS 842381 (Oct. 30, 1996) (cited in
Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-2 (2001)). The IRS has, among all such
factors, emphasized "control" as the standard and main test. IRS Handbook (cited in Tax Man-
agement Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-2 (2001)).
15. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2).
16. Id.
17. In reality, of course, self-employed persons pay SECA, not FICA tax.
18. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., No. C93-178D, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21039 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 15, 1994), rev'd and remanded by, 97 F. 3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc, 105 F.
3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998); Burnetta v. Com'r, 68 T.C. 387 (1977);
Burrey v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 159 F. 3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998); Herman v. Time Warner, Inc., 56 F.
Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Brown-Graves Co. v. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 206 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2000).
19. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Overmeyer, 845 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
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FICA,20 by its terms, is silent on the issue of whether workers may
maintain such a private right of action.
Plaintiffs seeking relief under federal statutes have often turned to
the courts where the statute of limitations has expired or their admin-
istrative remedies have been exhausted. Historically, the Federal
courts have been reluctant to authorize a private right of action under
federal law where a statute itself is silent on the matter. 21
In Cort v. Ash22 the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-
factor test for determining whether private rights of action may be
implied from a federal statute. 23 The Supreme Court further modified
its four-part test in later rulings appointing Congressional intent as the
key factor in finding a private right of action. In Middlesex County
Sewer Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,24 the Supreme
Court refined the analysis of Congressional intent under what has be-
come known as the "Sea Clammers doctrine. '25 Under the Sea Clam-
mers doctrine, courts should deny private rights of action under
statutes accompanied by a "comprehensive enforcement system. '26
Such a system, the doctrine reasons, is evidence that Congress in-
tended an administrative, not private, remedy for aggrieved parties.
Despite the Supreme Court's announcement of the Sea Clammers
doctrine, the Federal courts remain divided on the question of
whether FICA confers such a private right of action to employees
against their employers.
Part II.B. describes the four-factor test that the Supreme Court set
forth in Cort v. Ash. Part II.D. outlines the Supreme Court's later
establishment of the Sea Clammers doctrine. Part III examines the
current divide among Federal courts on whether a private right of ac-
tion exists under FICA. Parts IV and V then outline the issue of
worker classification in light of the administration of FICA and
SECA. Finally, Part VI sets forth an analysis supporting the applica-
tion of the Sea Clammers doctrine as the appropriate standard of re-
view and determines that, based on the Sea Clammers analysis and
20. Federal Tax Law is also silent.
21. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975); see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
22. Cort, 422 U.S. 66.
23. Id. at 78. The relevant factors to consider include: (1) whether a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff is created by statute; (2) whether there is an indication of explicit or implicit legisla-
tive intent to create or to deny a remedy; (3) whether implying a remedy for the plaintiff is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of
action is one that is traditionally relegated to state law. Id.
24. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
25. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
26. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Mc-
Donald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 2002).
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key policy considerations, no private right of action should exist under
FICA.
II. THE EVOLVING IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION DOCTRINE
A. General Principles
Courts traditionally equated legal rights with attendant remedies. 27
A right 28 without a remedy,2 9 it has been said, is a "monstrous absurd-
ity."'30 Under this traditional approach courts filled gaps that the leg-
islature left by supplying a remedy to enforce a statute that contained
rights and duties, but lacked enforcement provisions.3 1 Courts applied
this traditional standard without conducting an independent inquiry
whether the statute provided for such a right of action. 32
Courts applied this standard 33 until the 1970s when they divided the
single traditional inquiry into three distinct inquiries concerning
rights, rights (or causes) of action, and remedies. 34 Breaking from the
27. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76
WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001); see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992)
(stating "[f]rom the earliest years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the
Judiciary to award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court, although
it did not always distinguish clearly between a right to bring suit and a remedy available under
such a right."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone: '[I]t
is a general indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.' "The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
28. Zeigler, supra note 27, at 147 n.3 ("[a] legal right is one that imposes a correlative duty on
another to act or refrain from acting from the benefit of the person holding the right.") (citing
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL
ESSAYS, at 35-38 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919)). A right of action is a right "'to seek judicial relief
from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement."' Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ.
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J. dissenting)).
29. Id. (stating that a remedy is a relief granted by a court).
30. Id. at 68 (citing Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838)).
31. Id.
32. Zeigler, supra note 27, at 68.
33. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1976).
34. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979). See generally Susan J. Stabile, The Role of
Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach
to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987); H. Miles Foy,
III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and
Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986); Robert H. A. Ashford, Implied Causes of
Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984);
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1193 (1982); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); Thomas L.
Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Morato-
220 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
traditional approach, these courts developed separate criteria to de-
termine whether a statute created an implied right of action. 35
B. Cort v. Ash
In 1975, the Supreme Court confirmed the separate status of an im-
plied right of action inquiry in Cort v. Ash.36 In that case, Ash, a
stockholder in Bethlehem Steel Corporation ("BSC"), claimed that
BSC directors had authorized the use of company funds for political
advertisements in the 1972 presidential campaign in violation of a fed-
eral criminal statute. 37 Ash sought injunctive relief against further ex-
penditures and damages in favor of BSC.38 The issue was whether a
private right of action for damages against the BSC directors was im-
plied in favor of a BSC stockholder under the applicable criminal
statute.3
9
The Court identified four criteria relevant to inquiries of this na-
ture: (1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose "especial benefit"
the statute was enacted?; (2) Is there any indication of Congressional
intent to create such a remedy?; (3) Is a private remedy consistent
rium - Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980) (provid-
ing discussions of the implied right of action cases).
35. In Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), and
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975), the Court focused solely on whether a
private right of action in favor of plaintiffs could be inferred from the statute involved. The Nat'l
R.R. Court stated:
The threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act or any other provision of law
creates a cause of action whereby a private party such as the respondent can enforce
duties and obligations imposed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of action exists
that we need consider [standing and jurisdiction].
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 456; see also Barbour, 421 U.S. at 413-14 ("The
question presented by this case is whether such customers have an implied private right
of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (Act or SIPA) to compel
the SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit."). In National Railroad
Passenger Corp., plaintiffs sought to enjoin discontinuance of certain passenger trains,
claiming that procedures required by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 had not
been followed before terminating service. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 455
n.3. In both cases, the court refused to imply a private right of action because plaintiffs'
suits might prevent the achievement of the statutory goals. The legislative history of
the Rail Passenger Service Act demonstrates that Congress rejected a provision that
would have permitted a private action to enforce the Act's provisions. Nat'l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 414 U.S. at 459-61 (citing Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S.
3706 before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 85 (1970)). The Barbour Court stated
that the overall structure and purpose of the legislative scheme are incompatible with
such an implied right. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 421.
36. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
37. Id. at 71-72.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 68.
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with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme?; and (4) Is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, so that an im-
plied right of action would be inappropriate? 40 The Court later em-
phasized that the ultimate goal of this inquiry is to determine the
intent of Congress in enacting the statute.41
The Court found that the federal statute in question was, at its core,
a criminal statute, but conceded that there may be instances where a
criminal statute, intended to protect a group of citizens, gives rise to a
private right of action on behalf of a member of that group. 42 How-
ever, the Court found that this was not an occasion where a private
right of action may be implied. In support of its holding, the Court
analyzed the four factors described above.
Taking these four factors in turn, the Court first stated that BSC
shareholders were not intended to benefit from the statute, which was
enacted as a protection against corruption within the political sys-
tem.43 Second, the legislative history and the plain language of the
statute gave no indication that Congress intended to provide a private
cause of action for damages or an injunction.44 Third, the Court found
that the damages and injunctive relief, which BSC shareholders were
seeking, would not further the goal of the statute (i.e., its underlying
scheme). 45 Finally, the Court found that the actions of the BSC board
of directors might give rise to a suit, under state law, on behalf of
shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court reasoned that, to
allow such a suit under the federal criminal statute in question, would
impose "an area traditionally committed to state law."'46
40. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975);
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916); see also Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 738, 740-42 (2d Cir. 1992)
(applying the Cort factors); Sadler v. Citibank, N.A., 947 F.2d 642, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1991) (also
applying the Cort factors).
41. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (asserting that the Cort factors and
traditional tools of statutory interpretation are "guides to discerning that intent").
42. Cort, 422 U.S. at 80.
43. Id. at 81-82.
44. Id. at 83-84. The Court stated that by remaining silent on the issue of damages, Congress
intended for the relationship between the corporation and shareholders to continue to be gov-
erned by state law.
45. Id. at 84. "Recovery of derivative damages by the corporation for violation of § 610 would
not cure the influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance may have had on a
federal election." Id.
46. Cort, 422 U.S. at 85.
2003]
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C. Cort v. Ash Progeny: Intent Emerges as Dominant Factor
Until Cort, the Supreme Court had never identified a right of action
as a separate analysis required for the award of a remedy under a
federal statute. However, in its aftermath, the Supreme Court con-
ducted a Cort analysis in a series of cases, reaffirming that a right of
action inquiry was a separate and critical part of the rights and reme-
dies equation. 47
In two of these cases, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 48 and Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,49 the Court elevated the
second prong Cort criterion - namely, whether Congress intended to
create a private right of action - as the predominant factor and down-
played the other three criteria.
In Touche Ross,50 the Supreme Court refused to imply a private
right of action under §17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on
behalf of brokerage firm customers in their action against accountants
who conducted a faulty audit of the firm's records. 51 The Court stated
that its "task [was] limited solely to determining whether Congress
intended to create the private right of action asserted" by the plain-
tiffs. 52 The Court explicitly stated that the third and fourth Cort fac-
tors favored implication of a private right of action, but noted that
"such inquiries have little relevance to the decision of this case."'53
In Transamerica,54 the Court framed this issue as "whether Con-
gress intended to create the private remedy asserted. ' 55 The Court
strongly emphasized the centrality of the Congressional intent inquiry,
"[w]e accept this as the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving
the issues presented by the case before us."'56 Despite its announce-
ment of the four-factor test, in later cases, the Court applied the Cort
factors inconsistently. While it appeared to recognize the predomi-
nant Congressional intent factor, the Court gave other factors sub-
stantial attention in some cases, while hardly mentioning them in
others. 57
47. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-72 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977).
48. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
49. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
50. Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
51. See id. at 570.
52. Id. at 568.
53. Id. at 575.
54. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. 11.
55. Id. at 15-16 (citing Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 568).
56. Id. at 16.
57. See Univers. Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) (stating that to determine
the ultimate question of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, the Court
[Vol. 1:215
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The Transamerica Court also appeared confused as to whether the
Cort test was in fact composed of four factors or one (i.e., Congres-
sional intent). In California v. Sierra Club,58 the Court stated that
Cort was the "preferred approach for determining whether a private
right of action should be implied from a federal statute. ' 59 The Sierra
Club Court further stated that the Cort factors were "the criteria
through which" Congressional intent is determined. 60 However, in a
concurring opinion, Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart and Powell
wrote that "the Court's opinion places somewhat more emphasis on
Cort v. Ash ... than is warranted in light of several more recent 'im-
plied right of action' decisions which would limit it,"61 and stated that
it is "clear that the so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the cen-
tral task of ascertaining legislative intent ... that they are not of equal
weight ... and that in deciding an implied-right-of-action case courts
need not mechanically trudge through all four of the factors when the
dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved. '62
Yet, in other cases, certain Justices have thundered against the ap-
plication of Cort and suggested that the original Cort analysis had
been overruled. For instance, Justice Scalia stated, "[T]he Court is not
being faithful to current doctrine in its dicta denying the necessity of
an actual congressional intent to create a private right of action, and in
referring to Cort v. Ash ... as though its analysis had not been effec-
tively overruled by our later opinions. '63 Justice Scalia went so far as
would consider three factors set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (citing Touche Ross &
Co., 442 U.S. at 575-76). The fourth factor ("whether the cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law") is not mentioned. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union
of America, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981), the Court restated the Cort factors:
The ultimate question ... is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
.... Factors relevant to this inquiry are the language of the statute itself, its legislative
history, the underlying purpose and structure of the statutory scheme, and the likeli-
hood that Congress intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies.
58. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
59. Id. at 292 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 26 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
60. Id. at 293 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
61. Id. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
62. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (making only brief reference to the issue and stating that
the focus is on the intent of Congress and that the other Cort factors are used to discern intent).
In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-42 (1984) and Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-48 (1985), the Court acknowledged that Congressional intent is the
main focus, but then proceeded to conduct a four-factor analysis.
63. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis ad-
ded)). Justice Scalia goes on to state: "I am at a loss to imagine what congressional intent to
create a private right of action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind the
creation of a private right of action." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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to suggest that the Supreme Court "should get out of the business of
implied private rights of action altogether. '64
This confusion has not gone unnoticed. The Court has acknowl-
edged its "great difficulty in establishing standards for deciding when
to imply a private cause of action under a federal statute which is si-
lent on the subject. '65 While the Court's standard, or standards, are
unclear, the results of its application are not. In numerous cases
where the statutory and legislative history were silent on the issue, the
Court required clear evidence of Congressional intent to provide a
private right of action 66-more often than not, it found none. 67
D. Sea Clammers Doctrine
In its 1981 decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Association68 ("Sea Clarnmers"), the Supreme
Court revisited Cort and its progeny. The Sea Clammers court added
an additional guideline and level of judicial scrutiny to the Congres-
sional intent factor. Whereas this patchwork of cases asks only
whether Congress intended to allow a private right of action under a
statute, the Sea Clammers analysis asks, in addition, whether a "com-
prehensive enforcement system" accompanies the statute.69 The Sea
Clammers court restrained the private right of action doctrine for stat-
utes accompanied by such a "comprehensive enforcement system. '70
A comprehensive enforcement system usually entails authority for
government officials to bring suit against the violator, extensive ad-
ministrative procedures, and possibly administrative remedies. The
Supreme Court added this additional level of scrutiny through the ap-
plication of the canon of statutory construction that if a statute ex-
pressly provides a particular remedy, courts should not invent
remedies of their own. 71
64. Id. at 192 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 656 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 190 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pointing out that court rejected claims
of implied right of action in nine of eleven recent cases); see also Stabile, supra note 34, at 870
n.65.
68. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
69. See id. at 19-20.
70. See id. at 20; see also Salazar v. Brown, 940 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that
no private cause of action exists under FICA and referring to the additional comprehensive
enforcement system requirement as the "Sea Clammers Doctrine").
71. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14-15:
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress
intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors
[v. Lewis], "it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute ex-
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In Sea Clammers, an organization that harvested fish and shellfish
off the coasts of New York and New Jersey sued government officials
seeking an injunction and damages for the defendants' failure to prop-
erly police pollution in these waters.72 The plaintiffs brought suit
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") and the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act ("MPRSA"). 73
Congress constructed the FWPCA and MPRSA quite similarly.
Both statutes provided that a citizen could bring a suit against any
person, including the United States, to enforce provisions of each stat-
ute. Each statute provided that plaintiffs bringing suit must provide
60 days notice of the alleged violation before commencing an action.
Finally, both statutes provided for the award of civil penalties to the
federal government for violation of the statutes' provisions. Neither
statute expressly authorized a private suit for damages.
The Sea Clammers plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under each stat-
ute, as well as $250 million in compensatory damages, and $250 mil-
lion in punitive damages.7 4 The plaintiffs failed to comply with the
notice provisions of the statutes.7 5
In evaluating whether a private individual could bring suit for dam-
ages under either statute, the Sea Clammers court focused on each
statute's "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions. '7 6 In light of
such enforcement provisions, the Court stated that "it cannot be as-
sumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional
judicial remedies of private citizens suing under MPRSA and
FWPCA." 77
The Court's analysis of the statutes' enforcement provisions was
grounded in the second Cort factor-legislative intent.78 The Court
stated that the legislative history of both statutes gave no indication
that Congress intended to create a private right of action aside from
that already provided in the statutes.79 The statutes' elaborate en-
pressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it." In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we
are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered
appropriate.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. The plaintiffs also brought a federal common-law nuisance claim. The Court ruled
that this claim was not available to private parties. Id. at 2. For purposes of the discussion here,
only claims under FWPCA and MPRSA will be evaluated.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 14.
78. See supra note 40.
79. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17-18.
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forcement mechanisms, as evidenced in the legislative history of
FWPCA and MPRSA, provided the impetus for the Court's ruling
that no private right of action existed.
III. THE SPLIT ON WHETHER A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
EXISTS UNDER FICA IN WORKER
MISCLASSIFICATION CASES
The federal courts are divided on whether a private right of action
exists under FICA,80 where employees have been misclassified as in-
dependent contractors. While the courts all analyze this issue under
the same Cort v. Ash framework, they diverge in their application,
producing conflicting and inconsistent results.81 The determinative
factor in this divergence appears to be the manner in how those courts
choose to apply the four-factor Cort v. Ash analysis and to what ex-
tent, if at all, the courts heed the increased scrutiny that the Sea Clam-
mers doctrine requires.
A. Courts Finding a Private Right of Action Exists
There are a number of cases that hold a private cause of action ex-
ists under FICA.82 None of these cases, however, engage in the strin-
gent four-part analysis that Cort v. Ash requires. The soundest cases83
supporting a private right of action are Sanchez v. Overmyer84 and
Ford v. Troyer.85
80. The same dispute affects an employee's Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA")
liability.
81. See, e.g., Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting that there is no
private right of action under FICA, where plaintiff was seeking monetary damages); DiGiovanni
v. City of Rochester, 680 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding no private right of action under
the general federal income tax withholding provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 3402); Spilky v. Helphand,
No. 91 CIV. 3045, 1993 WL 159944 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (holding that there is no private
right of action under FICA and FUTA); Salazar v. Brown, 940 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(holding that no private right of action exists under FICA and referring to the additional com-
prehensive enforcement system element as the "Sea Clammers Doctrine"); White v. White Rose
Food, 62 F. Supp. 2d 878 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), on remand from 128 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997); see Cal.
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., Colunga v. Young, 722 F. Supp. 1479 (W.D. Mich. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 255 (6th
Cir. 1990) (note that in affirming Colunga, the Sixth Circuit never reached the FICA issue);
Saintida v. Tyre, 783 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Calderon v. Witvoet, 764 F. Supp. 536 (C.D.
Ill. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 999 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1993); Charite v. Jones, 116 Lab.Cas.
35,384, No. 89-2548, 1990 WL 165247 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1990); Certilus v. Peeples, 101
Lab.Cas. 34,587, No. 81-46 Civ-DC-12, 1984 WL 3175 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 1984).
83. It is interesting to note that both cases were brought by pro se plaintiffs. This fact may
explain the courts' leniency (and imprecision) in applying the elements of Cort v. Ash.
84. 845 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
85. 25 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. La. 1988).
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1. Sanchez v. Overmyer
In Sanchez, plaintiffs were agricultural workers alleging that their
former employers' classification of them as independent contractors
violated FICA. 6 The defendant-employers moved for judgment on
the plaintiff's pleadings, asserting that no private right of action exists
under FICA. Rejecting the defendants' assertions, the Sanchez court
cited "numerous" federal cases where the "courts have entertained
actions by agricultural workers for an employer's violation of the
FICA. ''8 7 The Sanchez court acknowledged, however, that where no
private right of action is explicitly provided for in a federal statute (as
is the case with FICA), courts must apply the four-factor Cort. v. Ash
test.88 By the Sanchez court's own admission, none of the "numer-
ous" cases that the court cited "engage in the stringent four-part anal-
ysis required by Cort."' 9
The Sanchez court engaged in a brief, but persuasive, discussion of
the Cort v. Ash four-factor analysis. 90 Addressing the first Cort fac-
tor-whether the plaintiffs were of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted-the court focused on the purpose of the "So-
cial Security system" in general and not FICA individually.91 This sys-
tem92 "was instituted to create a trust fund to benefit workers upon
86. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1179.
87. Id. at 1180 (citing Colunga v. Young, 722 F. Supp. 1479 (W.D. Mich. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d
255 (6th Cir. 1990); Saintida v. Tyre, 783 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Calderon v. Witvoet, 764
F. Supp. 536 (C.D. Ill. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 999 F. 2d 1101(7th Cir. 1993); Charite v.
Jones, 116 Lab.Cas. 35,384, 1990 WL 165247 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1990); Certilus v. Peeples, 101
Lab.Cas. 34,587, No. 81-46 Civ-DC-12, 1984 WL 3175 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 1984); Strong v.
Williams, 89 Lab.Cas. 33,929, No. 78-124-CIV-TG, 1980 WL 8134 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 1980)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting no private right of
action under FICA where plaintiff sought monetary damages); DiGiovanni v. City of Rochester,
680 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding no private right of action under federal income tax
withholding provisions of the Code).
90. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1181. The Sanchez Court stated the following regarding the first
prong of the test:
The FICA is not, unlike most other provisions of the tax code, a general provision
intended to benefit the government by outlining a general revenue collection scheme.
Rather, the Social Security system was instituted to create a trust fund to benefit work-
ers upon disability or retirement, in order to "save men and women from the rigors of
the poorhouse as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when jour-
ney's end is near." The preface to the Social Security Act itself states that the purpose
of the Act is to establish "a system of [f]ederal old-age benefits." There is little doubt
that plaintiffs are members of the principal group the FICA was enacted to benefit:
workers of the United States.
Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Which presumably, in so far as the Sanchez Court was concerned, includes both FICA and
the Social Security Act ("SSA").
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disability or retirement" and "establish 'a system of federal old-age
benefits.' 93 "There is little doubt," the court insisted, "that plaintiffs
are members of the principle group FICA was enacted to benefit:
workers of the United States. ' '94
Focusing on the second, and preeminent, Cort factor-Congres-
sional intent-the court noted that nothing within FICA, or its legisla-
tive history, provided support for the creation of a private right of
action. 95 Quoting Thompson,96 the Sanchez court stated that a finding
of Congressional intent to create a private right of action "does not
require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute,
actually had in mind the creation" of such a right.97 The Court further
stated that the implied right of action doctrine would be a virtual
"dead letter" if its application were limited to correcting drafting er-
rors when Congress simply forgot to codify its intention to provide for
a right of action. 98
Undeterred, the court stated that, despite the statute's silence on
the issue, legislative intent may be determined through examination of
the structure and language of the statute or the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment.99 On this basis, the court reasoned that the
relief the plaintiff was seeking 00 was "consistent with the purposes of
the FICA and the circumstances of its passage," 101 since "[w]orking
men and women will not be able to draw social security upon their
retirement unless they and their employers have contributed to the
fund during their working years."'1 02 The court was of the view that
such a private right of action was necessary so that workers properly
classified as employees could compel their employers to correct their
93. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1181 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937), Soc.
Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364 (1946)) (stating that the purpose of the Social Security
Act was to provide funds for the support of workers who "have ceased to labor."). Notably, the
Sanchez Court failed to examine FICA under the "especial benefit" prong of the Cort test.
94. Id. at 1181. In the opinion of the author, SSA, not FICA, was intended to provide this
benefit.
95. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 694 (1979)).
96. 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
97. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1181.
98. Id. (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179).
99. Id.
100. In Sanchez, the plaintiff-employee sought an order to force his former employer to cor-
rect his employment record and make appropriate FICA contributions for wages he earned as an
employee, not monetary damages. The Sanchez Court never reached the question of whether a
private right of action for monetary damages is implied under FICA. Id. at 1181-82.
101. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1181 (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641).
102. Id. The Sanchez Court apparently ignored the fact that the employer's obligation to
contribute funds under FICA are independent of the government's disbursement obligations
under the Social Security Act.
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earnings records and make the "required and correct contribution" to
the FICA trust fund. 103
Furthermore, the court attached particular significance to the in-
demnification clause of FICA.a0 4 The court reasoned that this provi-
sion indemnifies an employer in an employee-based action for FICA
deductions. 10 5 Through implication, the court concluded that it must
be assumed that Congress contemplated employee-based actions
under FICA against employers for incorrect amounts paid or failure
to pay.10 6
Finally, the court summarily concluded that both the third (consis-
tency with legislative scheme) and fourth (action not traditionally rel-
egated to state law) Cort factors were met.107
2. Ford v. Troyer
Ford v. Troyer'0 8 is a worker misclassification case brought under
FICA.10 9 The plaintiff, Ford, claimed his former employer, Troyer En-
terprises ("Troyer"), improperly classified him as an independent con-
tractor.110 As a result of the misclassification, Troyer was alleged to
have failed to withhold and remit federal social security taxes. 1' Ford
sought to compel Troyer to pay the employer share of these FICA
taxes.112 Troyer claimed that Ford was an independent contractor
and, accordingly, that he had no private right of action for any alleged
failure, on Troyer's part, to withhold those taxes." 3
The Ford court acknowledged, as did the Sanchez court, that "there
is no express right of action for an employee to sue his employer"
under FICA, and that courts are divided on the question of whether
an implied private right of action exists under those statutes."14
103. Id.
104. See I.R.C. § 3102(b) (2001).
105. Sanchez, 845 F. Supp. at 1181.
106. Id. at 1181-82.
107. Id. at 1182. According to Sanchez, FICA was enacted to establish a trust fund for retire-
ment. The Sanchez Court stated that permitting a private right of action is consistent with this
purpose. Further, the court noted that the establishment and maintenance of a natural retire-
ment and welfare fund is not a matter traditionally relegated to the states. Id.
108. 25 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. La. 1998).
109. Id. at 725.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Ford, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 726; see supra note 89.
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The Ford court adopted the reasoning of Sanchez to determine that
such an implied right of action does exist. 115 The court, with little
other discussion, found Sanchez's position concerning the indemnifi-
cation provision of FICA particularly "persuasive."' 16 The court also
distinguished the withholding of income tax from the withholding of
FICA taxes. 117 In contrast to FICA taxes, the court found no author-
ity for a private right of action for an employer's failure to withhold
income taxes, since §3403 of the Code prohibits an employer from
being liable "to any person."11 8 The court reasoned that "while the
withholding of income taxes is to benefit the federal government as a
revenue collection measure, the withholdings under FICA ... are in-
tended to fund the social security program which is for the benefit of
the employee." 119
B. Courts Finding No Private Cause of Action
There is moderate support among the lower courts and the federal
circuit courts for the position that a private right of action does not
exist under FICA. 120
115. Id.
116. Ford, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (citing Campbell v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding a private right of action for injunctive relief to enforce FICA and FUTA); Colunga v.
Young, 722 F. Supp. 1479,1489 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (finding an employer violated FICA by failing
to withhold and pay its portion of employee's social security taxes). Compare Salazar v. Brown,
940 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding no private right of action under FICA); Spilky v.
Helphand, No. 91 Civ. 3045, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993), No. 91 CIV.
3045, 1993 WL 159944 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (no private right of action for employer's failure
to withhold or pay social security and unemployment taxes); Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (no private right of action against employer for failure to pay social security and
unemployment taxes)).
117. Id.
118. Id. In Sanchez, the court emphasized the indemnity provision of §3101(b) of the Code,
which provides that "an employer who deducts FICA taxes from an employee's wages will 'be
indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any such payment
.... - Sanchez v. Overmyer, 845 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1993). The Sanchez Court
stated:
This indemnification provision has been in the Social Security Act since its original
enactment in 1935. The logical inquiry then is against whom is the employer indemni-
fied? The only possible answer is that this provision indemnifies an employer in an
action brought by the employee over FICA deductions from the employees wages ...
by implication it must be assumed that Congress envisioned actions under FICA by
employees against employers for incorrect amounts paid or complete failure to pay
FICA taxes.
Id. at 1181-82.
119. Ford, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
120. See e.g., Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting no private right of
action under FICA); DiGiovanni v. City of Rochester, 680 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding
no private right of action under the general federal income tax withholding provisions); Spilky v.
Helphand, No. 91 Civ. 3045, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993), No. 91 CIV.
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1. McDonald v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.
Perhaps, the most compelling authority that a private right of action
does not exist under FICA is McDonald v. Southern Farm Bureau Life
Insurance Co.121 McDonald worked as an insurance agent and agency
manager for Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. ("SFBL"). 122
McDonald's employment agreement with SFBL classified him as an
"independent contractor" and stated that "nothing contained herein
shall be construed to create the relationship of employee and em-
ployer between [McDonald] and [SFBL]."'1 23 Notwithstanding the
terms of his employment contract, McDonald claimed he was an em-
ployee of SFBL,1 24 not an independent contractor, because SFBL ex-
ercised substantial control over his work activities.1 25 As an
independent contractor, McDonald would be responsible for payment
of the entire tax applicable to his wages under SECA.
McDonald claimed that the SFBL's misclassification of him as an
independent contractor and failure to pay the employer portion of the
FICA tax violated FICA. 126 McDonald further claimed that SFBL's
misclassification caused him to pay FICA taxes he would have not
otherwise paid since, as an employee, he would have only paid the
employee portion of that tax.127
The McDonald court posed the issue in the case as "whether the
text, structure, or legislative history of FICA creates by implication a
private cause of action."'1 28 In order to make this determination, the
court reviewed the four-part Cort v. Ash analysis, noting that the
"central inquiry" is whether Congress intended to create a private
right of action. 129
3045, 1993 WL 159944 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (holding no private right of action exists under
FICA and FUTA); Salazar v. Brown, 940 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Mich 1996) (holding no private
right of action exists under FICA); White v. White Rose Food, 62 F. Supp. 2d 878 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), on remand from, 128 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
121. 291 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 2002).
122. Id. at 721.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 721. Specifically, McDonald claimed SFBL regulated his hours,
dictated the manner in which he sold insurance, provided him with an office, supplies and secre-
tarial support, and regulated his advertising. Id.
126. Id. at 721-22.
127. Id. at 722.
128. Id.
129. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 722-23. "'[L]ike substantive federal law itself,"' stated the Court,
"'private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is
to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy."' Id. at 723 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citations omitted)).
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The court cautioned that the "bar for showing legislative intent is
high" and that "[w]ithout it, a cause of action does not exist and courts
may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute.' 130 The McDonald court
applied the Cort factors as follows:
1. "Especial Benefit": Language, Structure, and
Legislative History
The McDonald court asserted that there is no basis in the statute for
asserting FICA was enacted for the "especial benefit" of employees
such as the plaintiff.131 FICA, the court reasoned, is simply a tax as-
sessment statute designed to raise revenue. 132
McDonald argued along the same lines as the court's reasoning in
Sanchez- the court should not focus on FICA itself, but rather the
SSA and the Social Security program as a whole. 133 McDonald ar-
gued that, since the funds from FICA taxes must be used exclusively
to fund Social Security134 and the SSA was enacted for the especial
benefit of American workers, 135 FICA benefits American workers as
much as the SSA.136
The court was unconvinced, stating that McDonald disregarded the
"crucial distinction" between FICA and the SSA. 137 According to the
McDonald court, FICA is "no different than any other tax specifically
designed to benefit the federal government by raising revenue.' 38 By
contrast, the SSA "unambiguously and intentionally provides funds
for disabled and retired employees."'1 39 The SSA, not FICA, was en-
acted to provide this benefit.140 The court further noted that a quali-
130. Id. at 723 (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (internal quotations omitted)).
131. Id.
132. Id. The court noted that all of the Code provisions enacted pursuant to FICA concern
the business of revenue collection: taxation rates, deduction and collection procedures, and ex-
planation of the types of employment and wages covered. Id.
133. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 723.
134. Id. at 724 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 911(a) (mandating that FICA collections "shall not be in-
cluded in the totals of the budget of the United States Government... and shall be exempt from
any general budget limitation imposed by statute .... )).
135. Id. at 723 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 301, et seq.; Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364
(1946) (stating that the purpose of the Social Security Act "is to provide funds through contribu-
tions by employer and employee for the decent support of elderly workmen who have ceased to
labor.")).
136. Id. at 724.






fying employee receives Social Security benefits regardless of whether
his employer has complied with FICA.141
2. Congressional Intent
FICA's legislative history, the McDonald court noted, "is com-
pletely devoid of any indication that private lawsuits ... were even
briefly contemplated by Congress.' 42 The court dismissed McDon-
ald's contention that Congressional intent could be inferred from the
mere fact that a private right of action would be "consistent" with the
"broad purpose" of the Social Security Act.143
McDonald's next argument, also consistent with Sanchez, focused
on the so-called "indemnification provision" of FICA. McDonald ar-
gued that Congress "would not have explicitly indemnified employers
if it did not assume that employees would have been able to bring
lawsuits under FICA.1 144 The court responded to this argument with
an analysis of §3102(b):
Section 3102(b), which appears as part of the statute's section on
deductions from employees' wages, protects employers who prop-
erly deduct FICA taxes from an employee's wages against claims by
employees that the money withheld and used to pay the tax should
have been paid to the employee as part of his salary. Because Con-
gress requires employers to withhold the FICA contribution and
pay the excise tax, it included the indemnification provision to pro-
tect employers from lawsuits by employees who do not want their
salaries reduced in compliance with FICA. Section 3102(b) offers
no reason to imply a private cause of action. 145
3. Consistency with Legislative Scheme
The McDonald court stated that courts must be extremely reluctant
and exercise great caution before seeking to provide additional reme-
dies where statutes have prescribed available remedies. 146
Invoking the Sea Clammers doctrine, the court then engaged in a
detailed analysis supporting its opinion that permitting private rights
141. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 724. "[A]s long as an employee's wages are properly reported to
the Internal Revenue Service... he will receive Social Security benefits even if the employer has
completely failed to pay its share of the FICA excise tax." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 413(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) ("'In determining whether
statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters
only to the extent it clarifies text."') (citations omitted)).
144. Id. at 725.
145. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 725.
146. Id. (citing Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989)).
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of action under FICA "would undermine the administrative proce-
dures that have been expressly created in order to assist workers who
* . .have been assessed improper FICA taxes." 147
According to McDonald, this "comprehensive regulatory scheme"
includes the following:
(i) Aggrieved parties may file with the Service Form SS-8 "Deter-
mination of Employee Work Status for Purposes of Federal
Employment Taxes and Income Tax Withholding." Filing
Form SS-8 permits workers to obtain a worker classification
determination from the Service; 148
(ii) Workers may file the with the Service for a refund of self-em-
ployment taxes allegedly overpaid;' 49
(iii) Workers may sue the government for a tax refund; 150 and
(iv) The SSA provides an "administrative mechanism through
which a worker may seek to correct any errors or omissions in
the records of his wages. .. 151
The McDonald court reasoned that the weight of these combined pro-
cedures, available through the Service and the Social Security Admin-
istration, "do not admit of a third approach, under which employees
and employers would litigate benefit and taxation issues outside the
statutory structure and without the presence of the agencies created
by Congress to administer this complicated system."'1 52 In the court's
view, allowing such private lawsuits would interfere with the frame-
work and procedures that Congress established. 153
Finally, the court concluded, although implying a private right of
action might not "offend basic principles of federalism" (the fourth
Cort factor), Congressional intent clearly precludes the implication of




149. McDonald, 721 F.3 at 725 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a)).
150. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)).
151. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(4)-(5) "This mechanism is superintended by the Social Se-
curity Administration, the largest adjudicatory body on the face of the earth, and provides the
safeguards of an adversary hearing before a professional Administrative Law Judge and eventual
judicial review."). Id. (quoting Salazar v. Brown, 940 F. Supp. 160, 164 (W. D. Mich. 1996))
(internal quotations omitted).
152. Id. at 725-26.
153. McDonald, 721 F.3d at 726.
154. Id. (quoting Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 558 (11th Cir.
1984)) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
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2. Salazar v. Brown
Further persuasive authority that a private right of action does not
exist for a plaintiff's FICA claim is Salazar v. Brown.155 In Salazar,
the plaintiffs were agricultural workers.1 56 Despite signing a one-page
contract acknowledging that they were an "independent contractor,"
the workers asserted that they were employees, not independent con-
tractors, and sought to compel compliance with FICA.157 The workers
requested a declaration that the employer had violated FICA and an
injunction directing defendant to file appropriate tax returns and re-
mit the employer's "share" of FICA taxes due on the workers'
earnings.158
The Salazar court held that, in light of the comprehensive enforce-
ment systems that Congress expressly created for both Social Security
and FICA obligations, the Sea Clammers Doctrine foreclosed the im-
plication of a private cause of action under FICA.159 The Salazar
court fully discussed the comprehensive enforcement system that ex-
ists for FICA in its analysis of Congressional intent under the second
prong of Cort v. Ash. 160 The Salazar court referenced in detail the
"complicated and interrelated system of statutes and regulations that
make up the federal social welfare program" under the SSA and the
Code.161 The Salazar court also pointed to the extensive administra-
tive provisions of the SSA and the Code for proper crediting of an
employee's wage records. 162 Finally, the court pointed to the criminal
and civil penalties under the IRC that exist to enforce both FICA and
FUTA. 163 Implicit in the court's analysis is the simple fact that the
sheer scope of administrative remedies available to employees and the
government weigh against finding an implied right of action. Why else
would Congress be silent on the issue of such private rights, but go to
such great lengths to provide a wide range of administrative
remedies?
Moreover, the Salazar court specifically addressed the flaws of the
Sanchez court's rationale, as discussed above, in light of various Sixth
155. 940 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
156. Id. at 161.
157. Id. at 161-62.
158. Id. at 162.
159. Salazar, 940 F. Supp. at 164.
160. Id. at 164-65.
161. Id. at 162.
162. Id. at 164.
163. Salazar, 940 F. Supp. at 163-64.
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Circuit cases addressing the Sea Clammers doctrine. 164 The court spe-
cifically held that the comprehensive enforcement systems that Con-
gress expressly created for both Social Security and FICA obligations
provides clear evidence that Congress provided precisely the remedies
it considered appropriate. In so holding, the court noted that
"[C]ongress has passed thousands of amendments to the Social Secur-
ity Act and the Internal Revenue Code, virtually on a yearly basis,
without once creating a private right of action."' 65
3. McElwee v. Wharton
Another case that supports the proposition that a private cause of
action does not exist under FICA, particularly in a FICA misclassifica-
tion case, is McElwee v. Wharton.1 66 This decision foreclosed yet an-
other mechanism for relief through the FICA statute. The employee,
a sales representative for various Bibles and religious books, 167 sought
to proceed on an equitable theory of recovery (tax restitution), rather
than under the FICA statutes.168 The court, however, reasoned that
the rationale of Salazar applies equally in a restitution claim. 169 Thus,
in granting the employer's motion to dismiss, the court held that there
was no need to recognize a new equitable theory of recovery where
the employee has other remedies available. 27° Of the specific reme-
dies available, the court listed: (1) administrative action under the
SSA if the mischaracterization affects rights to retirement benefits; (2)
the employee may urge the Service to enforce the legal tax obligations
of the employer; and (3) if the employee mistakenly paid SECA taxes
which were not due, the employee may claim a refund from the
Service.171
In addition to the above, many courts have expressed policy con-
cerns with allowing a private right of action under FICA, or FUTA,
because of the possibility for inconsistent results of actions brought by
employees and the Service.172 Moreover, the courts expressed con-
164. Id. at 166 (citing Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 182 (6th Cir. 1996); accord, Local 3-689, Oil.
Chem. & Atomic Int'l Union v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 131, 134 (6th Cir.
1996); Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995)).
165. Id. at 166.
166. 19 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
167. Id. at 768.
168. Id. at 770.
169. Id. at 771.
170. McElwee, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Salazar, 940 F. Supp. at 167.
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cern over the impact on judicial efficiencies and the Service's adminis-
trative process.
Courts finding no private right of action under FICA cite the com-
plexity of the statute and its administrative remedies (along with those
of the SSA), and note its function as a means of generating revenue
apart from the SSA to emphasize that it was not designed for the "es-
pecial benefit" of a person. In light of the courts' focus on Congres-
sional intent, it is important to highlight the system that Congress
created for FICA's administration. The following section contains a
review of the statutory framework of FICA and discusses the adminis-
trative relief provisions for worker misclassification issues.
IV. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. FICA and Social Security
The Social Security Act 173 was enacted in 1935 as part of an exten-
sive program of retirement, unemployment, and welfare benefits for
qualifying individuals who were unemployed or unable to work. To-
day, the progeny of those original programs include old-age, survivor
and disability insurance benefits, as well as hospital insurance benefits
for the aged and disabled. Those programs are financed primarily
from taxes that employers, employees and the self-employed pay
under the provisions of FICA174 and SECA. 175 Unemployment insur-
ance benefits are financed solely from taxes imposed on employers
under the provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
("FUTA"). 176 The Service collects each of these taxes.177
B. Federal Insurance Contributions Act
FICA measures the amount of wages paid with respect to employ-
ment in order to impose a tax on employees and employers.178 FICA
is composed of two elements: (1) old-age, survivor and disability in-
surance ("OASDI"); and (2) hospital insurance ("HI"). OASDI taxes
173. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935); see also Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937) (holding the SSA to be constitutional.
174. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, I.R.C. § § 3101-3128 (1986) (amended 2000)
(§ 3113 repealed 1976).
175. Self-Employment Contributions Act, I.R.C. § § 1401-1403 (1986) (amended 1997).
176. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, I.R.C. § § 3301-3311 (1986) (amended 2002).
177. Id.
178. § 3101(a), (b); § 3111(a), (b); see also § 3121 (defining "wages" and "employment").
Employment is defined for FICA purposes as "any service, of whatever nature . . ." § 3121(b).
An employee, not an independent contractor, must perform the service. § 3121(d) (listing sev-
eral categories of employees). Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-1 (2001).
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are used to fund retirement and disability benefits. HI taxes are used
to provide health and medical benefits for the aged and disabled. 179
1. Computing FICA Tax
The tax rate in effect at the time that the employee's wages are
"received" is used to compute the employee portion of FICA tax. The
rate in effect at the time that wages are "paid" 18 0 is used to compute
the employer's portion of the tax. An employee 'receives' wages at
the time the employer pays them to the employee. The employer
'pays' wages when they are actually or constructively paid to the
employee. 181
2. Collection and Liability for FICA Tax
Employers deduct the tax from the wages of each employee at the
time of payment to collect the employee portion of the FICA tax.182
An employer is liable for the employee portion of the tax (in addition
to the employer portion of the tax) regardless of whether the tax is
collected from the employee. 183 If the employer withholds less than
the correct amount or fails to withhold any part of the tax, the em-
ployer is nevertheless liable to the government for the correct amount.
179. Since 1990, the employer and employee OASDI and HI taxes have equaled 6.2% and
1.45%, respectively.
180. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, I.R.C. § § 3101, 3111 (1986) (amended 1987); see
Algie v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., No. 89 CIV. 5471, 1995 WL 606096, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 12, 1995).
181. Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-4th T.M. at A-2 (2001).
182. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, I.R.C. § 3102(a) (1986) (amended 1994). The em-
ployer is required to collect and pay the tax in cash, even if the employee is compensated in a
form other than cash. Treas. Reg. § 31.102-1(a); see also Rev. Rul. 81-222, 1981-2 C.B. 205
(FICA taxes on meals and lodging were deducted from the employee's cash wages). Termina-
tion of an employee does not relieve the employer of its liability to collect the tax on any wages
paid subsequent to the termination. Rev. Rul. 68-492, 1968-2 C.B. 417; Rev. Rul. 71-525, 1971-2
C.B. 356; see also Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974) (trustee in bankruptcy was required
to withhold FICA taxes on wages even though the employment relationship between the bank-
rupt employer and the employee had terminated).
183. § 3102(b). The employee is also liable for the employee portion of the tax until it is
collected from him. Treas. Reg. § § 31.3102-1(c), 31.3102-1(c); see also Navarro v. United States,
72 A.F.T.R.2d 93-5424 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding Service not required to first seek payment
from employer for employee's share of FICA taxes); Ford v. Troyer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. La.
1998) (holding employee has private right of action against former employer alleging wrongful
classification as independent contractor insofar as claims relate to failure to withhold FICA and
FUTA taxes, but not for failure to withhold income taxes). See McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau
Life Ins. Co., No. 01-15648, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9110 (11th Cir. May 13, 2002) (holding FICA
creates no implied private cause of action for individual to sue alleged employer to compel pay-
ment of tax).
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An employer's liability for the employee portion of the Social Security
tax is generally determined under §3102(b). 184
Withholding FICA taxes forms a trust fund. The individuals within
a company responsible for withholding, accounting for, and paying
over the trust fund to the government can be held personally liable for
the unpaid amounts under §6672.185
C. Self-Employment Contributions Act
SECA imposes a tax on the "self-employment income" of individu-
als. 186 As a self-employed person, an independent contractor pays for
his own "social security" in the form of self-employment taxes. 187 Sec-
tion 1402(b) defines "self-employment income" as "net earnings from
self-employment," less wages subject to withholding. 188 Section
1402(a) defines "net earnings from self-employment," subject to cer-
tain exceptions and exclusions, as business gross income less deduc-
184. I.R.C. § 3509 (1986) (amended 1990) limits the employer's liability for collecting and
paying the employee portion of the tax if the failure is due to the employer's treatment of the
individual as an independent contractor. Under this exception to the general rule, the em-
ployer's liability for the employee's share of the social security tax is limited to 20% of the
applicable employee tax, provided the employer has filed all information returns required of the
employer in a manner consistent with the employer's treatment of the individual as an indepen-
dent contractor. The employee's liability for the employee portion of the tax is not affected by
the employer's liability under § 3509. Rev. Rul. 86-111, 1986-2 C.B. 176. See also Navarro v.
United States, No. EP-92-CA-375-B, 1993 WL 291381 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 1993) (IRS not re-
quired to first seek payment from employer for employee's share of FICA taxes). Tax Manage-
ment Portfolio (BNA) 391-4th T.M. at A-2 (2001).
185. See, e.g., Byrd v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1980).
186. SECA tax is assessed according to rates set forth in I.R.C. § 1401(a) (1986), relating to
OASDI, and I.R.C. § 1401(b) (1986), relating to HI.
187. I.R.C. § 1401 (1986) (amended 1990). The self-employed rate has been 15.3% since 1989.
Id. See also Briant v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 472 (T.C. 1982). Self-employment income
subject to tax is determined by an individual's net earnings from a trade or business carried on as
a sole proprietor or by a partnership of which he or she is a member. If an individual is engaged
in more than one trade or business, net earnings from self-employment consist of the aggregate
of the net earnings from all such trades or businesses. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(c) (1974). Every
self-employed United States citizen and resident alien with net earnings from self-employment
of $400 or more is liable for self-employment taxes, even if there is otherwise no liability to file
an income tax return. I.R.C. § 6017 (1986).
188. Self-Employment Contributions Act, I.R.C. § 1402(b) (1986) (amended 1993). If, how-
ever, the net earnings from self-employment are less than $400, no tax is due. § 1402(b)(2). An
individual's net earnings from self-employment is not subject to the OASDI portion of SECA
tax to the extent that net earnings exceed the OASDI taxable wage base in effect for the calen-
dar year in which the individual's taxable year begins, minus the amount of any wages paid to
the individual during the taxable year. § 1402(b)(1). All net earnings from self-employment
received are subject to the HI portion of SECA taxes. § 1402(b)(1) (referring to the "contribu-
tion and benefit base").
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tions plus the taxpayer's distributive share of partnership income and
losses. 189
The definitions of "wages" and "employee" for SECA tax purposes
exclude those parties not subject to tax-employees. A self-employed
person pays an amount equal to the employee portion, plus the em-
ployer portion of employment taxes. However, the self-employed
worker is allowed to deduct one-half of the SECA taxes either in com-
puting the individual's self-employment earnings subject to SECA tax,
or for purposes of arriving at his federal adjusted gross income.190
As discussed above, the application of FICA and SECA creates
considerable tax ramifications. Application of either FICA or SECA
is dependent on the issue of worker classification. In light of the sig-
nificant liabilities under FICA and SECA arising out of misclassifica-
tion, Congress and the Service created various forms of administrative
relief. The following section discusses those relief mechanisms.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF: SOLUTIONS FOR MISCLASSIFICATION
A. Section 530 Relief
Whether a worker is classified as an employee, whose employer is
responsible for remitting FICA taxes to the federal government, or an
independent contractor, who himself is responsible for remitting
SECA taxes, has been a widely litigated issue. Congress attempted to
remedy this problem through the enactment of a safe harbor relief
statute, codified as §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.191
The purpose of §530 is twofold: (1) it provides employers relief
from the financial burden associated with the Service's re-classifica-
tion of workers, including the attendant costs of litigation; and (2) it
spares the Service from having to issue additional rulings and regula-
tions on the issue.192 An employee's compliance with certain tests
189. Section 1402(a) defines the term 'net earnings from self-employment' as: (a) gross in-
come derived from a trade or business, less allowable deductions attributable to such trade or
business; plus (b) an individual's distributive share (whether or not distributed) of the net in-
come or loss from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which the individual is a
member. I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1986) (amended 1990). A taxpayer need not personally be active in
managing or operating a trade or business to be subject to self-employment taxes. If, however,
the taxpayer is not actively involved, the trade or business must have been carried out on his
behalf through his agents or employees, or constitute his distributive share of income from a
partnership of which he was a member. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(b) (1974), 1.1402(c)-i (as
amended 1968).
190. See I.R.C. § 164(f) (1986); § 1402(a)(12).
191. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). Tax Management
Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-1 (2001).
192. H.R. REP. No. 95-1800, at 271 (1978). Section 530's prohibition against reclassification
by the Service does not affect a worker's status. It only acts to relieve the employer from the
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under §530 lets the employer avoid having to demonstrate the appro-
priate status of its workers, either under statutory provisions or com-
mon law rules, and escape re-classification. 193
Section 530 is strictly an employer's relief statute-it is not available
to workers.194 The number of businesses that can qualify for relief
under §530 is limited. Section 530's requirements are difficult to meet.
Taxpayer-employers must meet three tests in order to avoid such lia-
bility: (1) a "reasonable basis" for treating the worker as an indepen-
dent contractor; (2) the filing of all required federal tax returns on a
basis consistent with an independent contractor classification; and (3)
treatment consistent with the treatment that took place for substan-
tially similar positions.195 Courts generally treat the issue of whether
the requirements of §530 have been met as a question of fact. 196 Em-
ployers have the burden of proof.197
1. Reasonable Basis Test
An employer meets the 'reasonable basis' test for treating the
worker as an independent contractor if the employer placed reasona-
ble reliance for the action upon at least one of the following:
effects of reclassification. In Hope Network v. United States, No. 1:98-CV-771, 2000 WL 637321
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2000), the court held that the IRS did not violate § 530(b) of the Revenue
Act of 1978 by issuing private letter rulings, because § 530(b) only applies to regulations or
revenue rulings, and not to private letter rulings, which may not be used or cited as precedent.
Id. at 4. Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-1 (2001).
193. See Gen. Inv. Corp v. United States, 823 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1987).
194. Ahmed v. United States, 147 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a university hospital's
medical residents could not rely on § 530 relief provisions to seek refunds of FICA taxes with-
held from their stipends).
195. The consistent treatment requirement as well as the tax return filing requirement both
apply to periods beginning after 1977. In the early days of § 530, this was an important qualifica-
tion. It no longer comes into play very often. Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at
A-l-A-9 (2001).
196. See, e.g., 303 W. 42nd St. Enters., Inc. v. IRS, 181 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1999), rev'g and
remanding 916 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Burgess v. United States, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA)
1641 (D. Nev. 1995); World Mart, Inc. v. United States, Nos. Civ 90-1596-PHX-EHC to CIV 90-
1600-PHX-EHC, 1992 WL 495194 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 1992).
197. Employers must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that relief under § 530
should be granted. Boles Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 77 F.3d 236 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the
burden of proof was on the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there
was a reasonable basis for treating workers as independent contractors, thus entitling the em-
ployer to § 530 relief); accord Dains v. IRS, 149 F.3d 1182 (6th Cir. 1998). But see REAG, Inc. v.
United States, 801 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
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a. Decision
The employer is entitled to rely on judicial precedent, or published
rulings, or a technical advice memorandum with respect to the em-
ployer, or a letter ruling issued to the employer. 198
b. Past Audit
Employers are entitled to rely on a past Service audit of the tax-
payer in which there was no assessment of employment tax deficien-
cies for amounts paid to individuals holding positions substantially
similar to the employee's position. 199 At the commencement of an
audit, the Service must provide the employer with written notice of
the provisions of §530.200 If the audit does not initially involve worker
classification issues, then the Service must be given notice at the time
the worker classification issue is first raised. 201
c. Industry Custom
Employers are entitled to rely on a "long-standing," recognized
practice of a "significant segment" of their industry as a reasonable
basis for classification. 20 2 Neither the statute nor the legislative his-
tory defines "industry" for purposes of the "industry practice" 20 3 anal-
ysis. Under the statute, a "long-standing practice" cannot be
construed as a practice that has continued for more than 10 years. 204
In other words, the Service cannot require employers to prove that a
practice has lasted for more than ten years. A "significant segment"
198. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(2)(A), 92 Stat. 2763, 2885 (1978). See
Hosp. Res. Pers., Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 421 (11th Cir. 1995); Critical Care Registered
Nursing, Inc. v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1991), nonacq. 1994-2 C.B. 1 (the use
of letter rulings not directed to the taxpayer employer are likely to be rejected as proof of a
"reasonable basis" for purposes of § 530 relief). Darrell Harris, Inc. v. United States, 770 F.
Supp. 1492 (W.D. Okla. 1991) (letter ruling relied upon was not addressed to the taxpayer
employer).
199. § 530(a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 2763, 2885. See also Lambert's Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v.
United States, 894 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1990). Marlar, Inc. v. United States, 151 F.3d 962 (9th Cir.
1998), remanded to No. C95-729L, 1999 WL 1103010 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 1999) (granting relief
to the owner of an entertainment club where, on previous audit of the taxpayer, the Service
approved of the treatment of dancers as lessees, not employees).
200. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 13 (1996).
201. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 13-14.
202. §530(a)(2)(C), 92 Stat. 2763, 2886.
203. See Gen. Inv. Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1987) (permitting avoid-
ance of employer tax liability for mining workers of a small mining concern on the basis of the
taxpayer's comparison of his employment tax treatment of such workers with the treatment af-
forded such workers by other small mining concerns in the taxpayer's county).
204. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 13-14. Section 530 does not require a length of ten years, but
precludes a court or the Service from requiring a length longer than 10 years.
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of the taxpayer-employer's industry means no more than 25% of the
industry.20 5 What an industry standard may be and how an industry
may classify certain workers are questions of fact. 20 6
d. Other Reasonable Basis
If the employer is unable to rely on a previous decision, a past audit,
or cannot prove his reliance on the requisite level of industry practice,
the employer may obtain §530 relief "if the taxpayer can demonstrate,
in some other manner, a reasonable basis for not treating the individ-
ual as an employee. ' 20 7 An additional manner of proving 'reasonable
basis' is reliance on professional advice. 20 8
205. S. REP. No. 104-281, at 26 (1996). An employer cannot be required to show more than
25% of the industry.
206. Deacon Drywall, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:CV-92-1357, 1994 WL 486872 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 1994). Questions of fact generally fall into three categories: (1) geographical areas;
(2) occupations; and (3) reliance by taxpayer-employers. Taxpayer-employers must do more
than simply testify in order to meet their burden. In re McAtee, 115 B.R. 180 (N.D. Iowa 1990).
§ 530 requires that in order to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the tax treatment, a taxpayer-
employer must prove that a "significant segment" of the industry follows a particular practice -
not that the entire industry follows that practice. Gen. Inves. Corp., 823 F.2d at 340. The prac-
tice in a given industry need not be uniform in order for the taxpayer to demonstrate that indi-
viduals should not be deemed employees. H.R. REP. No. 95-1748 (1978); see also Tech. Adv.
Mem. 86-40-004 (June 16, 1986) (requiring that any industry practice be 'legitimate'). Some
courts require an employer to rely on the industry practice for the treatment of workers in order
to support a 'reasonable basis' claim. W. Va. Pers. Servs., Inc. v. United States, No. 2:94-0604,
1996 WL 679643 (S.D. Wa. Va. Sept. 16, 1996). In Options for Senior Am. Corp. v. United
States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 666 (D. Md. 1998), the taxpayer employer was granted summary judgment
upholding its claim to § 530 relief for treating its non-skilled home health care aides as indepen-
dent contractors. The taxpayer-employer surveyed twenty to thirty competitors in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 668. 80% of the competitors stated they treated the aides as independent
contractors; 10% treated them as employees; and the remaining 10% did not respond to the
taxpayer-employer's survey. Id. The court treated the 80% as a 'significant segment' of the
industry. Id. at 669; accord McClellan v. United States, 900 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
207. Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518. See also In re Rasbury, 130 B.R. 990 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1991), affd, 141 B.R. 752 (N.D. Ala. 1992). H.R. REP. No. 95-1445, at 271 (1978) (describ-
ing Congressional intent in enacting § 530).
208. In Smoky Mountain Secrets, Inc. v. United States, 910 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), a
food company treated its telemarketers and delivery persons as independent contractors. The
company treated its home office staff, its warehouse workers, its office managers, its regional
managers, and its corporate officers as employees. Id. at 1318. The president consulted the
company's CPA as well as his personal CPA concerning a then-new provision of the Code,
§ 3508, to determine that section's application to the company's classification of its telemarketers
and delivery persons. Id. at 1319. The purpose of § 3508 was to ensure independent contract
classification for certain 'direct sellers' and persons involved in the real estate business. Id. at
1321 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACr OF 1982 382
(Comm. Print 1982)). Both CPAs concluded that the telemarketers and delivery persons were
being properly treated as independent contractors for § 3508 purposes. Id. at 1321. The Smokey
Mountain Court stated that reliance on the CPAs' advice established a 'reasonable basis' under
§ 530 for the independent contractor treatment accorded the workers. Id. at 1323. The court
explained that, whether the CPAs were right or wrong, the company was entitled to rely on their
advice for the reason that most taxpayers are not competent to determine whether professional
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2. Tax Return Test
In order to obtain Section 530 relief, a taxpayer-employer must next
pass the Tax Return Test. This test requires that all federal tax returns
be filed on a basis consistent with the taxpayer's treatment of the
worker as an independent contractor.20 9 An employer's failure to file
IRS forms 1099, reporting the payments to workers treated as inde-
pendent contractors, is fatal to a claim for §530 relief.210 It is up to the
taxpayer-employer to prove that the IRS forms 1099 were filed.21'
3. Position Test
Section 530 relief requires that, in order to obtain classification as
an independent contractor, the taxpayer-employer, as well as its pred-
ecessors, has not treated any worker holding a substantially similar
position as an employee. 212 This "Position Test" requires consistency
in how workers are treated. 21 3
advice, such as that of an accountant or an attorney, is erroneous. Id. at 1324. The court further
reasoned that it would be overly burdensome to require taxpayers to monitor or verify a profes-
sional's opinion since it would "nullify" the reason for seeking such advice in the first instance.
Id. (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985)). But see United States v. Arndt, 201
B.R. 853, 860 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that "an accountant's advice is not the type of 'technical
advice' that can serve as the basis upon which a taxpayer can reasonably rely."). In other cases,
proof of a 'reasonable basis' for § 530 relief is determined based on an analysis of common law
factors. See Rev. Rul. 82-83, 1982-1 C.B. 151; Am. Inst. of Family Relations v. United States, No.
CV 72-1402-WMB, 1979 WL 1347, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1979).
209. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(1)(B), 92 Stat. 2763, 2885.
210. Murphy v. United States IRS, No. 93-C-156-S, 1993 WL 559362, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 22,
1993). But if the taxpayer employer has filed the required returns for some periods and not for
others, § 530 relief will still be available for the periods for which the required returns were filed.
In re Bentley, 175 B.R. 652 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994).
211. Prince Cable, Inc. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 96-516 LON, 1998 WL 419979, at *6 (D.
Del. Apr. 9, 1998) (finding that all the IRS has to do is deny receipt).
212. §530(a)(3), 92 Stat. 2763, 2886. The Chief Counsel's Office stated that, in addition to not
treating an individual as an employee for any period, § 530 relief is only available if all federal
returns required to be filed by the taxpayer with respect to the individual for the period were
filed on a basis consistent with the taxpayers treatment of the individual as not being an em-
ployee. I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 200129008 (July 20, 2001). The requirement applies to prede-
cessors in order to prevent evasion through the use of business reorganizations. Rev. Proc. 85-
18, 1985-1 C.B. 518. See Smith v. United States (In re Smith), No. 94-01463, 1993 WL 164415 83
(Bankr. D. Haw. Jan. 28, 1999), affd on other grounds, 243 B.R. 89 (D. Haw. 1999); In re Super
Van, Inc., 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 1995).
213. In Leb's Enters., Inc. v. United States, No. 97 CV 4718, 2000 WL 139551 (N.D. I11. Jan.
26, 2000), the court denied § 530 relief to a vehicle transportation company. The taxpayer-
employer had two sets of driver-shutters. Id. at 1. One group worked under the taxpayer em-
ployer's contract with Illinois Bell. Id. The other worked under the taxpayer employer's con-
tract with Alamo. Id. Most of the Illinois Bell and Alamo workers were treated as employees.
Id. However, when a worker was assigned to some other customer's place of business, the tax-
payer-employer treated those workers as independent contractors. Id. at 2. The taxpayer-em-
ployer argued that it treated a worker as an employee or as an independent contractor
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B. Classification Settlement Program
The Service has established a special Classification Settlement Pro-
gram ("CSP") to allow taxpayer-employers and examining agents to
resolve worker classification issues. 214 Under the CSP, if an examin-
ing agent determines that the taxpayer-employer may have errone-
ously classified a worker as an independent contractor, the agent will
determine whether the taxpayer may be eligible for relief under §530.
The Service may determine that the taxpayer is eligible for a CSP set-
tlement offer based on the agent's evaluation if the taxpayer-employer
agrees to classify its workers as employees prospectively. If the tax-
payer has filed all returns consistent with the treatment of the workers
in issue as independent contractors (Tax Return Test), but failed to
consistently treat either the workers in issue or substantially similar
workers as independent contractors (Position Test), or lacks a reason-
able basis for treating the workers as independent contractors (Rea-
sonable Basis Test), the CSP offer will consist of a full employment tax
assessment for the one taxable year under examination. If the tax-
payer meets the Tax Return Test, and has a colorable argument that it
meets the Position Test and the Reasonable Basis Test, the Service
offer will include an assessment of 25% of the employment tax liabil-
ity for that year. If, however, the taxpayer clearly meets all three of
the tests, no assessment is made and the taxpayer may choose to con-
tinue treating its workers as independent contractors.215
The preceding section reviewed administrative relief provisions de-
signed to resolve the threshold issue in implied right of action cases
under FICA-worker classification. In order to conduct an effective
Congressional intent analysis, as Cort v. Ash and Sea Clammers re-
quire, it is necessary to review both the scope of administrative relief
and the comprehensive enforcement system discussed in McDonald in
light of tax policy considerations and a review of the proper role of the
judiciary.
depending on that worker's duties and level of supervision. Id. at 4. The taxpayer-employer
pointed to the way the worker's time was tracked, the various tasks a driver who was an em-
ployee might be asked to perform, and the fact that the employees were guaranteed a minimum
of eight hours per day, whereas the independent contractors were paid specific rates for specific
jobs, with no time guarantees. Id. The court ignored most of the factors, explaining that it must
look at the job performed, not the relationship between the workers and the taxpayer. Id. The
court emphasized that the workers need not perform identical job duties, just "substantially simi-
lar" job duties. Id. Based on cases such as Leb's, taxpayer-employers must prove that the duties
of all similar positions are substantially the same for all similar positions.
214. The CSP was established effective March 5, 1996, for a two-year trial period, and then
indefinitely extended in Rev. Proc. 98-21, 1998-15 I.R.B. 14.
215. In this latter situation, the taxpayer may, at its option, prospectively treat the workers as
employees. Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) 391-3d T.M. at A-1 (2001).
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. Applying the Sea Clammers Doctrine
There is a spectrum of possibilities as to when courts should imply a
private right of action. Professor Stabile, a leading scholar in this
area, points to the following "continuum":
(1) a private right of action exists for every violation of federal
law;
(2) a private right of action impliedly exists for every violation of
federal law absent contrary congressional intent;
(3) an analysis of some set of factors . . . determines whether
there is an implied cause of action;
(4) congressional intent creates a rebuttable presumption in either
direction: either a private right of action presumptively exists
if there is congressional intent in favor of one, which presump-
tion may be overcome by other factors against implication; or,
in the absence of congressional intent, a presumption against
the existence of an implied right of action, which presumption
may be overcome by other factors mitigating in favor of
implication;
(5) no private right of action exists in the absence of clear evi-
dence of legislative intent to create one; and
(6) no private right of action exists unless the statute in question
expressly provides one.216
Courts have gravitated towards the center of this spectrum, sacrificing
the certainty of either end for the middle ground and choosing Con-
gressional intent as the preeminent factor. Although they have pur-
portedly applied the same Cort v. Ash analysis to FICA, the courts
have generally been inconsistent in their results (effectively ruling all
along the spectrum). This mixed bag of results is a product of the
courts' difficulty in applying a uniform standard for determining Con-
gressional intent-Why is determining Congressional intent so
difficult?
There are a number of recognized means for determining Congres-
sional intent regarding an implied right of action. One indication of
Congressional intent is "context," or the prevailing understanding of
substantive law on the part of Congress and the courts when the stat-
ute was enacted. In other words, when Congress enacted the statute,
did it view it as necessary to explicitly include a right of action or did it
view the courts as having the authority to imply such a right? 217 In the
case of FICA, however, such an indication of intent is not very helpful
216. Stabile, supra note 34, at 876.
217. Stabile, supra note 34, at 88-88 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988)
(considering the status of custody orders under the full faith and credit doctrine at the time of
passage of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 295
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since the very determination of "context" in this instance is necessa-
rily based on a subjective decision as to whether Congress viewed
FICA solely as a revenue statute or as part of a broader Social Secur-
ity program. Further, FICA and its attendant regulations have been
amended with some frequency. In the absence of a static "context,"
such an analysis is of dubious value.
Another indication of Congressional intent asks whether the crea-
tion of a private right of action is necessary to effectuate Congress'
goals in enacting the statute in question and whether it is consistent
with Congress' purpose. 218 FICA is, by itself, solely a revenue act.
Implying a private right of action to assist a taxpayer in recovering a
tax that has already been paid appears to serve little purpose.
Since FICA's legislative history is silent on the matter, courts are
left without any firm indication of Congressional intent, save what af-
firmative steps both Congress and the Service have taken to adminis-
ter that statute. The Sea Clammers doctrine examines the nature of
those affirmative steps (e.g., a comprehensive enforcement system) as
the best indication of Congressional intent.
Application of the Sea Clammers doctrine forecloses private rights
of action where the existence of a comprehensive enforcement system
evidences Congressional intent. When a statute contains a compre-
hensive remedial scheme including an integrated set of enforcement
mechanisms, a court should presume that Congress deliberately omit-
ted any additional remedies. A court should not imply any private
rights of action that the statute does not specifically authorize. Such
conduct clearly violates the spirit of the Sea Clammers doctrine and
forecloses the application of Professor Stabile's "continuum".
As the McDonald court stated, FICA's legislative history "is com-
pletely devoid of any indication that private lawsuits ... were even
briefly contemplated by Congress. 2 19 Again, individually, FICA is a
tax assessment statute designed to raise revenue.22 0 Taxpayers have a
number of remedies available to them through the Service and the
Social Security Administration.22 1 In addition to the remedies that
the McDonald court described, both Congress and the Service have
created administrative mechanisms designed to remedy the threshold
issue of worker classification under §530 and the CSP.
n.7 (1981); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) (stating courts construe statutes with
reference to the circumstances existing at the time the statute is enacted)).
218. Stabile, supra note 34, at 898 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)).
219. See McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 724 (11th Cir. 2002).
220. See id. at 723.
221. See id. at 725-26.
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While the sheer weight and scope of remedies described in McDon-
ald appear to satisfy an intuitive sense of fairness-How will courts
determine whether government administration of a statute constitutes
a "comprehensive" (or "elaborate" as the Sea Clammers court uses)
enforcement system in the future? What enforcement system is suffi-
ciently "comprehensive" or "elaborate" to satisfy the Sea Clammers
doctrine?
Quoting Salazar, the McDonald court noted that aggrieved workers
could seek adjustment of their Social Security accounts before an
"ajudicatory body" under the Social Security Administration.222 Ac-
cording to the McDonald court, this administrative adjudication
mechanism provides the safeguards of an adversary hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge and eventual judicial review.223 This dis-
cussion appears to be an implicit reference on the part of the McDon-
ald court to some form of procedural due process.224 Neither the Sea
Clammers or McDonald courts addressed the issue of due process di-
rectly, nor did the plaintiffs in either case. 225 However, it appears safe
to assume that both the Supreme Court in Sea Clammers and the
Court of Appeals in McDonald were cognizant of the continuing obli-
gation of the government to refrain from depriving the plaintiffs in
those cases of their constitutionally protected procedural due process
rights. Since the courts did not see fit to address the due process issue
in either case, they likely considered such requirements as being
satisfied.
In determining the proper approach for ascertaining Congressional
intent, one must not lose sight of important policy considerations, so
as to ensure that such an approach is consistent with fundamental
principles of tax law. The following section discusses the implied right
of action issue in light of these principles.
222. See id. at 725.
223. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 725. The author suggests that the Service should provide a notice
to both employers and employees concerning the issue of worker classification and the various
right and remedies (including administrative programs such as the CSP) available to each.
224. Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit governmen-
tal actions depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clauses have a procedural
aspect. They guarantee that each person must be accorded certain "process" if they are deprived
of life, liberty or property.
225. A full-blown analysis of the procedural due process considerations involved in the en-
forcement system described in McDonald is beyond the scope of this article.
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B. Fairness, Efficiency & Enforceability Support Application of
Sea Clammers Doctrine
1. General Principles of Fairness, Efficiency & Enforceability
A resolution of the issue of implied rights of action based on the
application of the Sea Clammers doctrine should also support the fun-
damental principles of tax law: (1) fairness; (2) economic efficiency;
and (3) enforceability. 226 Divided federal courts have consistently ig-
nored these principles through the varying application of Cort factors
and their concomitant failure to apply the Sea Clammers doctrine.
Taxpayers have been left in the wake of such decisions to struggle with
factual analogies to circumstances in which Congressional intent sup-
porting a private right of action was found (or absent).
2. Fairness
Fairness is viewed as a principal philosophical foundation of the
Code.227 Advocates or critics of various tax proposals often invoke
the fairness principle on behalf of their cause.228 The manner in which
226. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 1996). The authors state that "[flairness
in taxation, like fairness in just about anything, is an ethical issue that involves value judgments."
Id. at 50. Whether a tax or a method of taxation is "fair" is a never-ending debate since there is
no definitive standard of fairness. Sharon C. Nantell, Federal Tax Policy in the New Millennium:
A Cultural Perspective on American Tax Policy, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 33, 82 (1999) (stating that there
is no single measure of fairness because "individual value judgment is involved . . ."); see also
Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 739-42 (1995) (analyzing
the application of fairness as a justification for the redistributive role of the progressive income
tax); Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Consumption-Based Tax Reform and the State-Local Sector: A Study
for the American Tax Policy Institute, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 115, 137 (1996) (stating that "[t]ax
systems may be evaluated on the basis of their fairness . . ."). With regard to principles of
efficiency, economists offer divergent opinions on how taxation affects prosperity. See Slemrod
& Bakija, supra, at 130-33 (discussing the cost of compliance as an additional burden). This
article assumes that adding greater simplicity and objectivity to the test in the form of a single
adjudicatory process (as Congress intended) will reduce the monetary outlay and time spent by
taxpayers and in the administration of FICA by the Service.
227. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?,
40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 631 (1998) (citing fairness as one of seven tax policy criteria); Nantell,
supra note 226, at 81-82 (discussing fairness as a criteria for evaluating tax systems); Alvin War-
ren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980); Holtz-
Eakin, supra note 226, at 137 (asserting that tax systems may be evaluated on the basis of their
fairness).
228. See, e.g., Prepared Statement of Representative Brian Baird Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Fed. Info. Sys. Corp., Washington, DC), June 23, 1999
(discussing tax fairness in the context of the federal sales tax deduction); Testimony, Olympia J.
Snowe, Senator, Senate Finance Taxation and IRS Oversight Subcommittee, Small Business Tax
Proposals, FDCH Congressional Testimony (June 5, 1997) (discussing clarification of the defini-
tion of 'independent contractor' as part of the Home-Based Business Fairness Act); Hess,
David, Cell Phone Tax Bill Clears House Panel, Committee Markups and Votes, 106 Markup
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the tax law is applied on an equal and uniform basis can be used to
measure 'fairness'. 229 In theory, a tax law provision should affect simi-
larly situated taxpayers equally.230 Non-discrimination 231 is a fairness
principle that generally pervades the law. 232 The non-discrimination
principle supports parity of treatment among similarly situated
taxpayers.
The current division among the federal courts on the issue of im-
plied rights of action under FICA arguably violates the non-discrimi-
nation principle, because similarly situated taxpayers (employers and
employees alike) in different federal court districts or circuits2 33 have
faced dramatically different outcomes 234 based on a disparate applica-
tion of Cort and Sea Clammers. This effectively grants to certain tax-
payers more rights than others. While some might consider the
expansion of available remedies to aggrieved workers to be more
'fair,' as described in greater detail below, it is not the proper role of
the courts, in this instance, to provide greater remedies than Congress
intended.
H.R. 4391, National Journal Group, Inc. (May 24, 2000) (discussing principles of fairness in how
to avoid circumstances where consumers might have to pay two or three taxes to different state
governments resulting from interstate cellular phone calls); Peterson, Molly M., Tax 'Fairness'
Bill for Workers Aboard Ships Sails Through Panel, Committee Markups and Votes, 106 Markup
S. 893, National Journal Group, Inc. (June 15, 2000) (discussing the 'Transportation Worker Tax
Fairness Act,' S. 893, which, based on fairness principles, would ensure that water vessel workers
receive the same tax treatment as airline and ground transportation workers).
229. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 226 (discussing the principle of horizontal equity).
230. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Phil-
osophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995) (discussing
proposed changes to graduated or proportionate income taxation based on principles of fair-
ness); Patrick B. Crawford, Analyzing Fairness Principles in Tax Policy: A Pragmatic Approach,
76 DENY. U. L. REV. 155 (1998) (discussing divergent forms of analysis in determining the basis
for 'fairness'); Carl T. Reed, Flat Tax, Fairness and Feasibility, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125
(1997) (discussing issues of fairness with respect to the 'flat' tax); John F. Coverdale, The Flat
Tax Is Not a Fair Tax, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285 (1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality,
Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1996) (describing 'a conception of
equality' with respect to the income tax). In general, principles of fairness are not subject to
demonstration. Reason only permits us to generate possible, and generally plausible, hypotheses
and apply principles of fairness to them. Principles of fairness are also "fuzzy" and open to
criticism because of their inherently subjective nature. See generally Crawford, supra.
231. See Crawford, supra note 230 (discussing non-discrimination principles as the basis for
arguments in favor of a consumption-based tax).
232. But see Hymel, supra note 227, at 615, 631 n.135 (stating that fairness may violate the tax
goal of simplicity). In the present case, however, the addition of another section to the Code in
the form of the proposed § 263B promotes simplicity because it provides taxpayers with a "way
out" of the subjectivity and complexity of the Wells Fargo criteria.
233. See supra Part III.A-B.
234. See supra Part III.A-B.
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3. Efficiency & Enforceability
Efficiency and enforceability are fundamental principles that should
be considered when reviewing a tax law.235 As applied to private
rights of action in this context, efficiency and enforceability are two
sides of the same tax policy coin. Allowing a private right of action
under FICA increases the possibility for inconsistent results in em-
ployee and Service-based actions. This dual system of enforcement
provides taxpayers with only anecdotal guidance on how to plan their
affairs. The absence of clear criteria diminishes the predictability of
tax treatment and makes compliance and planning difficult for taxpay-
ers and the Service.
The incongruity among the courts has produced an environment in
which similarly situated employers and employees obtain dramatically
different results in civil litigation depending on the federal district or
circuit in which they reside. Uniformity of decision-making among
courts is often cited as a critical issue for the proper administration of
the Code. In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,236 the Second
Circuit declared "[t]he taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and
penalties for guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or
standards to let him know what his rights and duties are. '237 The
same can be said for the general administration of the tax and Social
Security systems in the case of employment taxes. A dual system of
enforcement for employment taxes - one administrative and the other
judicial - would deprive taxpayers of clear criteria. Notwithstanding
the confusion among the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court's
own inability to agree on the nature and scope of the Cort v. Ash test
is a testament to the difficulties of private enforcement in this arena.
Moreover, the administration of a dual system will have a negative
impact on judicial efficiency. In Sea Clammers, Justice Stevens admit-
ted that "a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens im-
posed upon the federal judiciary . . . has been more and more
reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. '238
Finally, the administration of two competing enforcement systems
simply costs more money. Presumably, taxpayers pay more to support
235. See supra note 210.
236. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
237. Id. at 785.
238. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982) ("Our approach to the task of
determining whether Congress intended to authorize a private cause of action has changed sig-
nificantly, much as the quality and quantity of federal legislation has undergone significant
change.").
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both systems than they would a single system. An administrative sys-
tem that specializes in adjudicating disputes in an area in which it both
regulates and possesses great expertise, would also likely produce
more accurate and efficient results.
C. Congressional Intent Has its Day
Proponents of implied rights of action argue that when a statute is
created that intends to benefit a certain class of citizens, "there is rea-
son to believe that Congress intended to afford members of that par-
ticular class the ability to privately enforce their rights. ' 239 As a basis
for this argument, these proponents point to the tort law maxim of ubi
jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right there is a remedy. 240 Yet,
this argument has the potential to come into conflict with the respec-
tive roles of the judiciary and the legislature under our separation of
powers. The recent trend in Supreme Court litigation highlights this
contrast.
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has gravitated towards
the last two points of Professor Stabile's "continuum" regarding the
decision to imply a private right of action. 241 Two decisions shed light
on the Court's movement - Mertens v. Hewitt Associates242 and Cen-
tral Bank v. First Interstate Bank.243
In Mertens, a class of beneficiaries of a pension plan sued the plan's
actuary for failing to adjust certain calculations under the pension
plan to account for early retirements. 244 The Court was faced with the
question of whether a non-fiduciary may be held liable for its partici-
pation in a breach of fiduciary duty that the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) imposes245-Does ERISA imply a pri-
vate right of action against non-fiduciaries for active participation in a
breach of fiduciary duty? In interpreting the statute, the Court found
that such an implied right of action did not exist.
The Court in Mertens found ERISA's comprehensive enforcement
scheme persuasive evidence that Congress intended it to be the sole
remedial avenue.246 Although the Court did not refer to Sea Clam-
239. Stabile, supra note 34, at 897.
240. Francine J. Rosenberger, Musick, Peeler, & Garrett v. Employers Insurance: Will the
Judicial Oak See A Judicial Forest?, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 987, 993 (1994).
241. See Gen. Inv. Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1987).
242. 508 U.S.248 (1993).
243. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
244. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
245. Id. at 249.
246. Id. at 254. "We emphasize[ ] our unwillingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA
context, since that statute's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides 'strong
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mers, its discussion of the comprehensive nature of the statute lends
great support to the denial of private rights of action where such com-
prehensive schemes are ingrained in statutes such as ERISA and
FICA.
One other point regarding Mertens is worth mention. Following the
Court's ruling, Congress did not amend ERISA to allow for such pri-
vate rights of action against non-fiduciaries.
In Central Bank, a bond purchaser sued the bond's trustee for its
participation in the bond underwriter's fraudulent cover-up of its fail-
ure to meet a requirement of the bond covenant. 247 The purchaser
alleged that the trustee violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 in that the trustee was "secondarily liable ... for its con-
duct in aiding and abetting the fraud. 248
In surveying the Security Exchange Act's provisions regarding ex-
press causes of action, the Court found no reason to believe that Con-
gress intended to create a private cause of action against one who aids
and abets a violation.249 Although the Court never spoke in terms of
a comprehensive scheme, its discussion of the numerous express
causes of action that the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide can be analo-
gized to Sea Clammers.
As stated earlier, the Sea Clammers court concluded that where a
comprehensive enforcement system exists, courts should not invent
their own private remedies.250 The ruling in Central Bank is simply
just another way of expressing the principle-where Congress has cre-
ated a laundry list of express causes of action, courts should imply
other rights.
Central Bank provides a fine illustration of the role that courts and
Congress play in the debate over implied rights of action. In 1998, in a
possible response to the Court's failure to recognize a cause of action
for aiding and abetting a violation of §10(b), Congress amended the
Securities and Exchange Act to allow for a private right of action
against those aiding and abetting one in violation of the Act.251 An
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incor-
porate expressly."' Id. (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-147
(1985)).
247. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 166-167.
248. Id. at 168.
249. Id. at 179. "From the fact that Congress did not attach private aiding and abetting liabil-
ity to any of the express causes of action in the securities Acts, we can infer that Congress likely
would not have attached aiding and abetting liability to § 10(b)." Id.
250. See supra note 57.
251. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t (e) (1997) (amended 2000) ("any person that knowingly provides sub-
stantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or
2003]
254 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
aggrieved investor may now bring a private right of action under
§10(b).
Although it is speculative that Congress responded specifically to
the ruling in Central Bank, the fact that such a private right of action
was added to the statute illustrates that it is Congress's role to provide
remedial alternatives. Congress certainly could have provided for a
private cause of action against non-fiduciaries for active participation
in a fiduciary breach under ERISA, stemming from the Court's hold-
ing in Mertens. Yet, no such private cause of action has been enacted.
Thus, Mertens and Central Bank show the proper roles the courts and
Congress should, and do play in interpreting and creating private
causes of action.
As the next section illustrates, the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged these roles, under the separation of powers doctrine, in the de-
bate over implied rights of action.
D. Role of the Judiciary: Judicial Restraint
Notwithstanding the policy considerations discussed above, there
are additional arguments for why courts should exercise restraint in
implying rights of action.
Federal courts should play a limited role in the interpretation of
federal legislation and should not perform legislative functions. As
Justice Powell stated in Cannon v. University of Chicago,252 "the dan-
gers posed by judicial arrogation of the right to resolve general socie-
tal conflicts have been manifest to this Court throughout its
history. '253 The federal courts must be cautious to avoid violating
separation of powers principles and invading the realm of legislation.
The federal courts' failure to apply the Sea Clammers doctrine en-
courages Congress to be irresponsible;254 "Congress is encouraged to
regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided").
252. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
253. Id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).
254. Justice Powell argued in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), that judi-
cial creation of a right of action violated separation of powers principles. He believed that in
addition to encouraging Congress to act irresponsibly, the Cort test "too easily may be used to
deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to substitute its
own views as to the desirability of private enforcement." Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). In
addition, he argued that "determining whether a private action would be consistent with the
'underlying purposes' of a legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the goals of
a scheme should be, and how those goals should be advanced." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Simi-
larly, in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988), Justice Scalia stated in his concurring
opinion that it was "dangerous to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can
prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies they favor."
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shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to
decide. When this happens, the legislative process with its public scru-
tiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to
everyone concerned. '255 The Court has made it clear that if legisla-
tion is vague or incomplete, it is Congress' responsibility to remedy it,
not the Court's. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,256 the Court
stated that it should not attempt to "improve upon the statutory
scheme that Congress enacted into law. '257 Separation of powers
principles preclude the federal courts from assuming legislative func-
tions. It is not proper for the Court to create rights that Congress did
not intend.
Congress's lawmaking powers are superior to those of the courts.
Congress can investigate facts and accommodate different viewpoints
in providing rights of action. 258 In addition, the complexity of FICA
and SSA legislation requires greater reliance on Congress and its role
in granting authority to the executive agencies that administer those
statutes. Congress provided for a single means of resolving disputes
under those statutes. Judicial creation of additional causes of action
or remedies may disrupt Congressional intent. In the case of FICA
and the SSA, Congress created administrative agencies to implement
legislation. Congress knows how to create private rights of action ex-
plicitly when it wants to.259 When a statute provides some remedies,
courts should be "chary of reading others into it.''260 Federal courts
255. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
256. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
257. Id. at 578; accord Univs. Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
258. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981) (noting that
legislative bodies can provide "'the kind of investigation, examination, and study that... courts
cannot,"' and that legislative process "'involves the balancing of competing values and interests,
which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives."' (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980)):
The legislature's superior resources for fact gathering; its ability to act without awaiting
an adventitious concatenation of the determined party, the right set of facts, the persua-
sive lawyer, and the perceptive court; its power to frame pragmatic rules departing
from strict logic, and to fashion a broad new regime or to bring new facts within an
existing one; its practice of changing law solely for the future in contrast to the general
judicial reluctance so to proceed; and, finally, the greater assurance that a legislative
solution is not likely to run counter to the popular will: all these give the legislature a
position of decided advantage, if only it will use it.
Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Law-Making - Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 767, 791-92 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
259. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979).
260. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (quoting Transamerica, 444
U.S. at 19); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 n.30
(1981) ("'frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute
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should be cognizant of their limited role and apply the Sea Clammers
doctrine to preclude private rights of action under FICA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress allocated tax liability under FICA, in part, both to em-
ployers and employees. Allocation of that liability is dependent on an
employer's facts-and-circumstances judgment as to whether their
workers are employees or independent contractors. Employers will
sometimes err when making this determination. In such event, Con-
gress has provided administrative relief for not only the resolution of
the worker classification issue, but the resolution of the tax ramifica-
tions of such misclassification. Misclassified workers should (and do)
have remedies available to rectify the negative consequences of mis-
classification under FICA. Proper application of the Sea Clammers
doctrine makes clear that those remedies do not include a private
right of action. A review of the tax policy considerations and the
proper role of the judiciary further demonstrates that implying a pri-
vate right of action under FICA would not only contravene Congres-
sional intent, but frustrate public policies of fairness, efficiency and
enforceability.
to subsume other remedies"') (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Pas-
sengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)).
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